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Constitutional Limits on State Campaign
Finance Disclosure Laws: What's the
Purpose of the Major Purpose Test?
Zachary R. Clarkt
INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the Supreme Court's recent decisions in
McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission' and Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission,2 states seeking to
control the influence of money in politics have fewer tools at
their disposal than ever before. This is especially worrisome in
modern times when private donors like the Koch brothers
reportedly plan on spending almost as much in the 2016 election
as the Democratic and Republican parties combined-much of
which will come from undisclosed sources. 3 Although the
Supreme Court has rebuffed campaign finance regulations that
limit amount of campaign contributions, the Court has also
repeatedly highlighted the benefits of disclosure laws. At the
same time, courts acknowledge that disclosure requirements
and other regulatory burdens can chill free speech and infringe
on personal privacy.4 Nevertheless, the Court has made clear
that disclosure laws respect First Amendment free speech rights
better than many alternatives because they do not place a hard
t B.A., University of Kansas, 2012; J.D. Candidate, The University of Chicago Law
School, 2016.
1 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014).
2 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
Nicholas Confessore, Koch Brothers' Budget Of $889 Million For 2016 Is On Par
With Both Parties' Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/27/us/politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-
campaign.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region&regio
n=top-news&WT.nav-top-news& -r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/2HQK-4VGR.
4 See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 337-40; Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland,
751 F.3d 804, 835 (7th Cir. 2014) ("Vague or overbroad speech regulations carry an
unacceptable risk that speakers will self-censor, so the First Amendment requires more
vigorous judicial scrutiny.").
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cap on speech, but instead compel entities to release additional
information.5 In fact, mandated public disclosure is a
cornerstone of campaign finance regulation in the United States
and is widely recognized as "fundamental to the political
system."6 Historically, disclosure laws enjoy strong support from
the public, politicians on both sides of the aisle, and the courts.7
The Supreme Court, however, has also staunchly protected First
Amendment free speech rights, especially with regard to
election-related speech where "there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was
to protect the free discussion ... of candidates."8
Although the right to speak freely about politics and
election-related issues may be of paramount importance, courts
recognize that disclosure regulations still play a significant role
in helping ensure that citizens are properly informed, as well as
preventing corruption and enforcing other election laws. 9 Thus,
it is of critical importance that disclosure laws strike the
appropriate balance between informing the public and
respecting individual rights.'0 The legal framework for
disclosure regulations has also become increasingly important
as the amount of campaign spending has grown rapidly in recent
years." The relative amount of source disclosure, however, has
simultaneously decreased greatly. In 2004, 96.5 percent of
outside campaign spending was disclosed, compared to only 40.8
percent in 2012.12
The states' inability to place hard limits on spending,
coupled with the surge in undisclosed campaign contributions,
" See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-67 (2010).
6 Trevor Potter & Bryson B. Morgan, The History of Undisclosed Spending in U.S.
Elections & How 2012 Became the "Dark Money" Election, 27 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 383, 388 (2013) (citing HERBERT E. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLITICS:
MONEY, ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL REFORM 194 (4th ed. 1992)).
Id. at 388 (citing R. Sam Garrett, Cong. Research Serv., The State of Campaign
Finance Policy: Recent Developments and Issues for Congress (2010), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/154166.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
3EVR-YALU).
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966).
9 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976).
'0 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-67 (noting that disclosure regulations can
burden the ability to speak, but can be justified based on substantial governmental
interest).
" Potter & Morgan, supra note 6, at 383-84.
12 Id. at 384, 442.
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makes disclosure laws more important than ever before. 13 There
is, however, widespread disagreement about what constitutional
limits are placed on disclosure regulation. In 1976, the Supreme
Court decided Buckley v. Valeo14 and narrowly construed the
term "political committee"-used interchangeably in modern
times with "political actions committee" and the acronym
"PAC"-in the Federal Election Campaign Act. The Court
defined the term so that an organization could be regulated as a
political committee under the Act only if the "major purpose" of
the organization was advocating for or against a candidate.
Circuit courts are split on whether this "major purpose test" is a
constitutional limit that applies to state laws, or is merely
statutory interpretation and therefore irrelevant to state
disclosure regulation. The Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
all maintain that the major purpose test is a constitutional limit
and therefore apply it to state disclosure regulations. The Ninth
Circuit is unique and uses "a" major purpose test, whereby
electoral advocacy need only be one of the major purposes and
not the primary major purpose of an organization. The First,
Second, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits hold that the major
purpose test is only statutory interpretation and, as a result,
does not apply to state laws. Instead, these circuits apply
exacting scrutiny to determine if there is a substantial relation
between the disclosure requirement and a sufficiently important
government interest. The different approaches to the major
purpose test among the circuits is largely explained by varying
interpretations of Buckley and McConnell v. Federal Election
Commission,1" a case in which the Supreme Court held that
certain aspects of Buckley were statutory interpretation and not
constitutional restrictions.
The impact of this split has enormous ramifications for
states seeking to exercise control over campaign finance. The
major purpose test places a strict limit on which groups states
can regulate. For instance, many states tie disclosure
13 Sean McMahon, Note, Deregulated But Still Disclose?: Disclosure Requirements
for Ballot Question Advocacy After Citizens United v. FEC and Doe v. Reed, 113 COLUM.
L. REV. 733, 771 (2013); Asher R. Ball, Note, Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc.
v. Swanson and Disclosure Burdens: Does Getting Corporations to Talk Suppress Their
Speech?, 91 NEB. L. REV. 706, 732 (2013) (asserting that post-Citizens United disclosure
laws may be more important than ever before).
14 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976).
540 U.S. 93 (2003).
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requirements to contribution or expenditure thresholds. 16
However, circuits that use the major purpose test have struck
down these regulations because they typically do not take into
consideration an organization's purpose.17 Meanwhile, the
circuits rejecting the test in favor of exacting scrutiny have
upheld such regulations.18 Use of the major purpose test may
also encourage donor groups to diversify their objectives in order
to avoid regulation. Despite the great uncertainty around what
constitutes constitutionally valid disclosure laws, the circuit
split and the constitutional status of the major purpose test have
not been fully explored in academic literature.19
To resolve the split, the major purpose test must be
examined to determine both whether it is a constitutional
requirement and whether it is good policy. First, examining
whether the test is a constitutional requirement, the Supreme
Court created the test in Buckley undoubtedly to narrowly
construe the Federal Election Campaign Act. In addition, the
Court in McConnell disregarded some of Buckley's narrowing
constructions as mere statutory interpretation. 2 0 Therefore, the
Court's analysis suggests by logical extension that the major
purpose test can be rejected as a constitutional requirement.
Second, when it was examined in Buckley, the Federal Election
Campaign Act imposed much more than just disclosure
obligations on regulated parties; it imposed hard caps on
16 See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2971(a)(1) (setting an expenditure threshold for
disclosure obligations at $500); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 1052(5)(A)(5) (imposing
disclosure requirements on any political committees that spend over $5,000 in a calendar
year).
" See, e.g., N.M. Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 679 (10th Cir. 2010);
N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 288 (4th Cir. 2008).
18 See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2014)
(upholding a definition of political committee based upon contributionlexpenditure
amounts and not the purpose of an organization); Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751
F.3d 804, 812 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding a Wisconsin statute that triggered disclosure
requirements based upon a group's expenditures/contributions); Nat'l Org. for Marriage
v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 58 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding a Maine statute that based political
committee status upon contribution/expenditure amounts).
19 See, e.g., Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The $500 Million Question: Are the Democratic
and Republican Governors Associations Really State PACs Under Buckley's Major
Purpose Test, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 485, 521-27 (2012) (noting the split
between "the" and "a" major purpose test, but not discussing which is legally correct,
though it favors "a" test for policy reasons); Douglas Oosterhouse, Campaign Finance
Reform and Disclosure: Stepping-Up IRS Enforcement as a Remedial Measure to
Partisan Deadlock in Congress and the FEC, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 261, 280 n. 161 (2012)
(noting only the split between "the" and "a" major purpose test).
20 McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 103 (2003).
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spending and source restrictions as well. Thus, even if the major
purpose test is a constitutional requirement, it is inapplicable to
state laws that impose only disclosure obligations. Finally,
evaluating the major purpose test from a policy perspective, its
severe drawbacks limit its desirability because it creates a
bright-line rule that groups can use to avoid regulation. This
functionally limits the amount of information available to the
public and undermines the effectiveness of disclosure laws.
Instead of the major purpose test, courts should apply
exacting scrutiny. Exacting scrutiny refocuses the analysis away
from determining an organization's operative goal onto actually
weighing the benefits of disclosure with its attendant burdens.
Exacting scrutiny rightly serves to keep disclosure regulations
from being so onerous that they chill speech or harm individual
privacy, but also gives states the discretion to design effective
regulations to keep the public informed. In addition, many
courts already conduct this kind of analysis-awkwardly-
through their application of the major purpose test. Replacing
the test with exacting scrutiny thereby allows courts to focus on
the real crux of the issue by balancing benefits and burdens out
in the open, without having to do so under the guise of the major
purpose test.
In Part I, this Comment examines the origin of the major
purpose test and its application by the Supreme Court. Part II
analyzes and evaluates the current stances of the circuit courts
to highlight the different approaches used and the basis for their
differences. Part III advocates the rejection of the major purpose
test in favor of an exacting scrutiny analysis based upon both
adherence to Supreme Court precedent as well as its practical
advantages.
I. HISTORY OF THE MAJOR PURPOSE TEST
To determine what role the major purpose test should play
in evaluating disclosure regulations, it is necessary to
understand its origins and history. The Supreme Court first
created the test in 1976 when it decided Buckley. In Buckley, the
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 197121 and its amendments, which imposed
21 Originally codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (current version at 52 U.S.C. §§ 30101-
30126).
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numerous regulations on political contributions and campaign
spending. 22 Included in these regulations was the requirement
that "political committees" register with the Federal Election
Commission, keep detailed records of their contributions and
expenditures, and file quarterly disclosure reports.23 The Act
also imposed hard contribution limitS 2 4 and source restrictions
as well.2 5 One of the claims presented to the Court was that the
definition of "political committees" was vague, overbroad, and
restricted speech that was protected by the First Amendment. 26
To combat these First Amendment concerns, the Court held that
political committees "need only encompass organizations that
are under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of
which is the nomination or election of a candidate."27 From these
words, the major purpose test was born.
The Supreme Court confirmed the existence of the major
purpose test ten years after Buckley in Federal Election
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.2 8 ("MCFL"),
where the Court was again tasked with interpreting the Federal
Election Campaign Act. 2 9 The Court's analysis focused on the
provisions of the Act that prohibited corporate expenditures on
elections and, as a result, the Court did not consider the major
purpose test in detail.30 Ultimately, in a plurality opinion, the
Court reaffirmed the test's existence when it noted that if an
organization passed the major purpose test, it would be
considered a political committee and therefore subject to greater
regulation. 31 However, in her concurrence, Justice O'Connor
foreshadowed the Court's later concerns in Citizens United when
she argued that the disclosure requirements at issue did not
22 See generally id.
23 See id. §§431-34, 438.
24 See id. §441a(a) ("No multicandidate political committee shall make
contributions-(A) to any candidate and his authorized political committees with respect
to any election for Federal office which, in the aggregate, exceed $5,000.").
25 See id. § 441b(a) ("It is unlawful for ... any candidate, political committee, or other
person [to] knowingly accept or receive any contributions [from national banks or
corporations as] prohibited by this section....") (held unconstitutional by Citizens United
v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)).
26 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 76-77.
27 Id. at 79 (emphasis added).
28 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
21 Id. at 271.
' Id. at 241.
3' See id. at 262.
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create constitutional problems, but the general regulatory
burdens imposed did. 32
The status and relevance of the major purpose test became
truly muddled in 2003 when the Supreme Court decided
McConnell v. Federal Elections Commission. In McConnell, the
Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002,33 an amendment to
the Federal Election Campaign Act, and its new restrictions on
soft money campaign expenditures and issue advocacy. 34 Again,
the Court focused on issues other than the major purpose test.
The Court did, however, mention the test briefly in a footnote
describing how the Federal Election Campaign Act is not
unconstitutionally vague.35
McConnell's other holdings found Buckley to be, in at least
some instances, statutory interpretation of the Federal Election
Campaign Act, casting doubt upon the major purpose test's
broader constitutional applicability. Specifically, the plaintiffs in
McConnell complained that the amendments to the Federal
Election Campaign Act violated their First Amendment rights
by placing restrictions on issue advocacy. The plaintiffs argued
that Buckley held that only restrictions on the express advocacy
of candidates were constitutionally permissible.36 The Court
found that this claim misinterpreted Buckley, as the express
advocacy distinction made in Buckley was held to be "the
product of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional
command."37 Within its discussion of the express advocacy
restriction, the Court held that "Buckley and MCFL were
specific to the statutory language before the Court and in no way
32 Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 266 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In my view,
the significant burden on MCFL in this case comes not from the disclosure requirements
that it must satisfy, but from the additional organizational restraints imposed upon it by
the Act.").
' Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
" See McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 224 (2003).
05 See id. at 170 n. 64 ('This is particularly the case here, since actions taken by
political parties are presumed to be in connection with election campaigns."). See
Buckley, 424 U.S., at 79 (noting that a general requirement that political committees
disclose their expenditures raised no vagueness problems because the term 'political
committee' 'need only encompass organizations that are under the control of a candidate
or the major purpose of which is the nomination or election of a candidate' and thus a
political committee's expenditures 'are, by definition, campaign related."').
36 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 190.
3 See id. at 191-92.
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drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the
permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related
speech." 38 Although the Court made these statements when
evaluating the express advocacy restriction, such statements are
a strong indication that Buckley's narrowing constructions are
only an interpretation of the Federal Election Campaign Act.
Read in this light, McConnell is strong evidence that the major
purpose test is not a constitutional limit.
The Supreme Court's more recent opinions on the status of
Buckley fail to shed further light on the major purpose test's
role. A plurality of the Court in Federal Election Commission v.
Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 3 9 clarified that McConnell did not
broadly overrule Buckley, but added no additional insight into
the status of the major purpose test.40 In Citizens United, the
Court partially overturned McConnell, ruling that it was
unconstitutional to restrict campaign expenditure based only
upon corporate identity.41 The major purpose test was irrelevant
to the case and therefore not addressed. In McCutcheon v.
Federal Election Commission, a plurality held that the federal
laws setting aggregate campaign expenditure limits were
unconstitutional. 4 2 This was in contrast to part of the Court's
holding in Buckley, where the Court upheld the Federal Election
Campaign Act's aggregate limits. 4 3 The Court explained itself by
reasoning that Buckley was interpreting a different statutory
scheme when it upheld the limits, and that the modern limits
were more burdensome. 44 In this way, the Court once again
acknowledged that at least some of Buckley's holdings were
matters of statutory interpretation. However, the major purpose
test went unmentioned.
Although some of the tests born from Buckley have lost
relevance,45 does the major purpose test have broader
3 See id. at 103.
9 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
40 Id. at 455 (holding that "McConnell did not purport to overrule Buckley... or even
address what Buckley had to say" on what test should be used to distinguish between
issue advocacy and candidate advocacy).
41 See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 365-66 (2010).
42 See McCutcheon v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014).
4 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976).
41 See McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446.
4 See, e.g., McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 191-92 (2003)
(invalidating the "magic words" and "express advocacy" distinctions as statutory
[ 2015534
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application? Is it a test that goes beyond just federal law and
tackles constitutional concerns of vagueness and overbreadth?
The fact that the test was created as an interpretation of the
Federal Election Campaign Act-which imposed more than just
disclosure obligations-and McConnell's treatment of Buckley
both suggest that the test is not a constitutional limit.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not been clear on this
issue, and, as a result, the circuit courts have taken a variety
of stances.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
Given the Supreme Court's lack of clarity on the role of the
major purpose test, it is not surprising that circuit courts
interpret the test in divergent ways. The purpose of the test is at
issue when circuit courts review state campaign finance
disclosure laws. If it is a test for constitutionality, then it applies
to state disclosure laws. If it is statutory interpretation, then it
does not and exacting scrutiny applies instead. In cases
challenging state campaign finance regulations under the First
Amendment, the circuit courts have interpreted the major
purpose test in four distinct ways. The Fourth, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits hold that the major purpose test is a test for
constitutionality and therefore is applicable to state disclosure
laws.4 6 The Ninth Circuit approaches the major purpose test as
a constitutional limit but modifies it. Under the Ninth Circuit's
interpretation, to be regulated as a political committee an
organization need only have "a" major purpose of the
organization be the election of a candidate-as opposed to "the"
major purpose. 47 In direct contrast are the First, Second, and
interpretation and not tests for constitutionality).
46 See, e.g., Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864,
872 (8th Cir. 2012) ("Emerging from Buckley was the so-called major-purpose test, a
judicial construct that limits the reach of the statutory triggers.. for [PAC] status.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); N.M. Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 677
(10th Cir. 2010) ("To be regulated under the standards established by the Supreme
Court, the... [state's laws] would need to satisfy the 'major purpose' test, because this
test sets the lower bounds for when regulation as a political committee is constitutionally
permissible."); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) ('"Thus,
we are convinced that the Court in Buckley did indeed mean exactly what it said when it
held that an entity must have the major purpose of supporting or opposing a candidate
to be designated a political committee.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
4 See Human Life of Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1011 (9th Cir. 2010)
("[We] reject... the notion that the First Amendment categorically prohibits the
government from imposing disclosure requirements on groups with more than one 'major
527] 535
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Eleventh Circuits. These courts treat the major purpose test as
statutory interpretation of the Federal Election Campaign Act,
inapplicable to state campaign finance laws. 4 8 Finally, the
Seventh Circuit takes a somewhat middle-of-the-road approach
by holding that, although the major purpose test is statutory
interpretation, it still has a role in determining the
constitutionality of state campaign finance laws. 4 9
A. "The" Major Purpose Test as a Constitutional Limit
The Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have all held that
the major purpose test is a constitutional limit on when
disclosure requirements can be placed on organizations. Each
court follows roughly the same logic-Buckley created the major
purpose test as a constitutional requirement and McConnell
either affirmed it, or at the very least did not overturn it.50 To
fully understand this position, the best case to examine is North
Carolina Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake.51 In Leake, the Fourth
Circuit used the same reasoning as the Eighth and Tenth
CircuitS 52 to adopt the major purpose test as a constitutional
limit and discussed these arguments in detail.
In Leake, the plaintiffs claimed that North Carolina's
campaign finance laws were unconstitutional under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. 53 One of these claims asserted
purpose."'). For an illustration of the difference between "the" major purpose test and "a"
major purpose test, see infra Part II.B.
48 See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 136 (2d Cir. 2014)
("We join the Circuits that have considered PAC definitions in this context after Citizens
United and hold that the Constitution does not require disclosure regulatory statutes to
be limited to groups having 'the major purpose' of nominating or electing a candidate.");
Nat'l Org. for Marriage Inc. v. Cruz-Bustillo, 477 F. App'x 584 (11th Cir. 2012) (rejecting
the major purpose test per the reasoning in Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d
34 (1st Cir. 2011)); Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011) ("We
find no reason to believe that this so-called 'major purpose' test, like the other narrowing
constructions adopted in Buckley, is anything more than an artifact of the Court's
construction of a federal statute.").
4 See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 839, 842 (7th Cir. 2014).
* See, e.g., Swanson, 692 F.3d at 872; Leake, 525 F.3d at 287-88; Colorado Right to
Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1152-54 (10th Cir. 2007).
5' 525 F.3d 274 (4th Cir. 2008).
*2 See Iowa Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Tooker, 717 F.3d 576, 586 (8th Cir. 2013)
(citing Leake to show that only major purpose groups can be subject to greater disclosure
regulation); Coffman, 498 F.3d at 1153-54 (citing Leake for the proposition that Buckley
created the major purpose test as a constitutional limit and McConnell did not overturn
it).
53 Leake, 525 F.3d at 277.
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that the state's definition of "political committee," which
included groups who had "a major purpose" of election advocacy,
violated the major purpose test from Buckley.54 To resolve these
issues, the Fourth Circuit looked to Buckley for guidance.55 Upon
examination of the wording in Buckley-particularly the
Supreme Court's use of the definite article in creating the test-
the Fourth Circuit concluded that it is indeed "the" major
purpose test.56 The court reasoned that the aim of the Supreme
Court in Buckley was to prevent disclosure regulations from
burdening protected political speech.57 Using "a" major purpose
test would mean that organizations engaged in protected speech,
unrelated to the election of a candidate, could potentially be
subject to regulation, thus violating their First Amendment
rights.58 Furthermore, the court pointed to the Supreme Court's
opinions in both MCFL and McConnell as supporting "the"
major purpose test.59 Based on this, the Fourth Circuit held that
the North Carolina statute regulating groups with only "a"
major purpose of electoral advocacy was unconstitutional
because it failed the major purpose test.60
Though the court in Leake does not discuss the merits of
whether the major purpose test is statutory interpretation or a
constitutional limit, it is obvious from the court's language and
ultimate ruling that it considers the test to be more than just
statutory interpretation. First, the court does not discuss
whether the major purpose test should be applicable to state law
as a test for constitutionality but analyzes the test as such when
examining the Supreme Court's language in Buckley.61 Second,
the court refers to the major purpose test as "analyzing the
permissible scope of political committee regulation," suggesting
1 Id. at 287.
55 Id.
56 Id. ("Viewed in light of Buckley's goals, it is clear that the importance the
plaintiffs attach to the definite article is correct.").
57 Leake, 525 F.3d at 287.
58 Id. at 287-88 ("If organizations were regulable merely for having the support or
opposition of a candidate as 'a major purpose,' political committee burdens could fall on
organizations primarily engaged in speech on political issues unrelated to a particular
candidate. This would not only contravene both the spirit and the letter of Buckley's
'unambiguously campaign related' test, but it would also subject a large quantity of
ordinary political speech to regulation.").
5 Id. at 288.
6 Id. at 290.
61 Leake, 525 F.3d at 286.
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that it applies broadly.62 In addition, the court interprets
McConnell's mention of the major purpose test in a footnote as
looking upon the major purpose test favorably. 63 The footnote in
McConnell, however, does little more than acknowledge the
creation of the test in Buckley.64 Given that the court ultimately
held the North Carolina law unconstitutional for regulating
groups with "a" major purpose of candidate advocacy,65 it is clear
that the Fourth Circuit considers the major purpose test to be a
constitutional boundary. However, Leake offers little evidence as
to why the major purpose test should be considered a
constitutional limit, aside from the policy considerations of
trying to protect political speech that is unrelated to the election
of a candidate.
B. "A" Major Purpose Test as a Constitutional Limit
Like the Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, the Ninth
Circuit also found that the Supreme Court set a constitutional
limit when it established the major purpose test in Buckley.
However, the Ninth Circuit differs in its exact interpretation
and application of the test. Per the court's decision in Human
Life of Washington, Inc. v. Brumsickle,66 the Ninth Circuit treats
the major purpose test as a constitutional limit, but held that "a"
major purpose of an organization must be electoral advocacy in
order to be regulated.67 In doing so, the court explicitly rejected
the Fourth Circuit's strict interpretation of "the" major purpose
test in Leake.68 The Ninth Circuit read Buckley as holding that
imposing disclosure requirements on groups whose single
primary purpose was political advocacy was clearly
constitutional. The court, however, pointed out that the
Supreme Court did not hold that only groups passing the major
62 Id. at 287.
63 Id. at 288 ("Furthermore, McConnell recently quoted Buckley's 'the major
purpose' language favorably.") (citing McConnell v. Fed, Elections Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93,
170 n. 64. (2003)).
6 See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 170 n. 64.
65 Leake, 525 F.3d at 290.
6 624 F.3d 990, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2010).
67 See id. at 1011 ("Under this statutory scheme, the word 'primary'-not the words
'a' or 'the'-is what is constitutionally significant.").
6 See id. at 1009 ("We disagree with [the plaintiff's and the Fourth Circuit's]
reading of Buckley, and we reject its invitation to adopt a bright-line rule prohibiting all
regulation of groups with 'a' primary purpose of political advocacy.").
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purpose test could be constitutionally regulated.69 Thus, the
Ninth Circuit interpreted Buckley to establish only "the outer
limits of permissible political committee regulation."70 The court
also held that MCFL did not reaffirm "the" major purpose test
as being the bright-line constitutional limit for all disclosure
regulations, but instead dealt primarily with campaign
expenditure limits and much greater regulatory burdens.71 As a
result, the Ninth Circuit held that groups only need "a" major
purpose of electoral advocacy to be subject to
disclosure regulation.72
To illustrate the importance of this difference, consider an
example. A farmers's association spends two-thirds of its budget
educating farmers on the latest advances in farming equipment
and techniques. The association spends the remaining third of
its budget on television ads supporting or opposing local political
candidates. Because the association spends a majority of its
resources on education for local farmers, "the" major purpose of
the association is not electoral advocacy. As a result, a court
using "the" major purpose test would strike down any disclosure
laws that applied to the association. However, under the test
used by the Ninth Circuit, the association could be subject to
disclosure obligations because spending a third of its budget on
election-related ads likely indicates that "a" major purpose of the
group is electoral advocacy.
C. The Major Purpose Test as Statutory Interpretation
The First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits all interpret
Buckley's major purpose test to be statutory interpretation and
therefore inapplicable to state disclosure laws. In its place, they
apply an exacting scrutiny standard and uphold laws that would
otherwise be struck down under the major purpose test.73 The
Seventh Circuit also rejects the major purpose test as being a
69 See id. at 1009-10.
7o Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1010 (quoting N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d
247, 327 (4th Cir. 2008) (Michael, J., dissenting)).
71 Id.
7 Id. at 1011.
' See, e.g., Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 123 (2d Cir. 2014)
(upholding a definition of political committee based upon contribution and expenditure
amounts and not the purpose of an organization); Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649
F.3d 34, 58 (1st Cir. 2011) (upholding a Maine statute that based political committee
status upon contribution and expenditure amounts).
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constitutionally-mandated test, but at the same time recognizes
it as an important check, striking a unique middle-of-the-
road approach.
1. The First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits.
The First Circuit held in National Organization for
Marriage v. McKee7 4 ("NOM I') that the major purpose test was
an instance of statutory interpretation, not a constitutional
limit.75 Per its ruling in National Organization for Marriage Inc.
v. Cruz-Bustillo,76 the Eleventh Circuit explicitly followed the
First Circuit's reasoning in NOM I and rejected the major
purpose test as a constitutional requirement.77 NOM I is also
representative of the Second Circuit's interpretation of the major
purpose test as well.78
In NOM I, the plaintiffs challenged Maine's campaign
disclosure laws that applied to "non-major purpose Political
Action Committees ('PACs')"-political committees that do not
have the major purpose of influencing an election, but make
expenditures or receive contributions in aggregate of $5,000 or
more a year.79 The plaintiffs alleged that the regulation of non-
major purpose political committees was overbroad and chilled
their political speech, thereby violating their First
Amendment rights.80
7 649 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2011) ("NOM I").
75 Id. at 59 ("We find no reason to believe that this so-called 'major purpose' test,
like the other narrowing constructions adopted in Buckley, is anything more than an
artifact of the Court's construction of a federal statute.").
7 477 F. App'x 584 (11th Cir. 2012).
n See id. at 585 ("We affirm essentially for the reasons indicated by the district
court and for the reasons that the First Circuit in Nat'l Org. for Marriage v. McKee,
rejected the same challenges.") (internal citations omitted). Note that the district court
found that the major purpose test was inapplicable because the regulations at issue did
not trigger based upon political committee status and did not impose political-committee-
like burdens. See Nat'l Org. for Marriage, Inc. v. Roberts, 753 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1222
(N.D. Fla. 2010) ("In this case, political committee status and burdens akin to those
under the federal statutes are not at issue. So the major purpose test is not applicable.
Under the Florida statutes, the trigger point for disclosure is speech that is an 'appeal to
vote' under [Wisconsin Right to Life], and thus unambiguously campaign related.
Requiring disclosure for such speech satisfies the exacting scrutiny test.").
78 See Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 135-36 (citing NOM I for the proposition that the major
purpose is only statutory interpretation).
" NOMI, 649 F.3d at 42.
a Id. at 48-49.
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The First Circuit began its discussion of the major purpose
test by noting that the test was dictum in Buckley, but was
accepted by the Supreme Court in later opinions such as
McConnell.8' The court also cited McConnell as showing that the
Supreme Court in Buckley was largely engaged in statutory
interpretation of the Federal Election Campaign Act. 82
Furthermore, the First Circuit noted that the Supreme Court
has never applied the major purpose test to state campaign
finance disclosure laws.83 Aside from Supreme Court
jurisprudence, the court also looked at the policy implications of
applying the major purpose test and found that it would yield
perverse results. 84 Mega-groups that donate millions of dollars
to campaigns and other causes could structure their actions to
avoid regulation, while small groups without the resources to do
more than engage in electoral advocacy would be subject to
regulation.85 Based upon these three reasons, the First Circuit
rejected the application of the major purpose test to state
disclosure laws.8 6 Instead, the court applied exacting scrutiny
and looked to whether there was a substantial relation between
the regulation and Maine's interest in disseminating
information about political speech. Under this analysis, the
court upheld Maine's disclosure requirements.87
2. The Seventh Circuit.
Like the First, Second, and Eleventh Circuits, the Seventh
Circuit rejects the major purpose test as a constitutionally-
mandated test, but still incorporates the test as part of its
exacting scrutiny analysis. When the court initially confronted
the issue in Center for Individual Freedom v. Madigan,88 the
court held that the major purpose test was mere statutory
interpretation and thus inapplicable to state disclosure laws.89
The Seventh Circuit, however, appeared to back off this stance
81 Id. at 58-59.
82 See id. at 59.




87 NOM I, 649 F.3d at 59.
" 697 F.3d 464 (7th Cir. 2012).
8 See id. at 487.
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with its later ruling in Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland,90
where the court held that the test was still an "important check"
to be used in the exacting scrutiny analysis.91
In Madigan, the Seventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff's
assertion that the major purpose test was a constitutional limit
on what groups could be subject to disclosure regulations. 92
Instead, the Seventh Circuit explicitly held that the major
purpose test "was a creature of statutory interpretation, not
constitutional command."93 The court based this on the fact that
the Supreme Court used the major purpose language when
interpreting a federal statute and has never applied the test to a
state law. 9 4 Ultimately, the court rejected the test because: (1)
the regulatory restraints imposed by the federal law in Buckley
were much more burdensome than the Illinois disclosure
regulations at issue;95 (2) the Illinois law was phrased in such a
way that it applied only to "genuinely campaign-related
transactions;"96 (3) the application of the major purpose test
would create perverse results where a small group could be
subject to regulation but a much larger group would not be;97
and (4) the major purpose test could easily be evaded by groups
who decided to engage in other activities just to avoid
regulation.98 The Seventh Circuit therefore held that Buckley's
major purpose test did not control its analysis of state law.99
In place of the major purpose test, the court used exacting
scrutiny to determine the law's constitutionality.100 Under
9 751 F.3d 804 (7th Cir. 2014).
9' See id. at 839 ("[The major purpose test] continues in force and effect as an
important check against regulatory overreach and becomes more significant as the scope
and burdens of the regulatory system increase.").
92 Id. at 487.
* Id. ("[Tihe 'major purpose' limitation, like the express advocacy/issue discussion
distinction, was a creature of statutory interpretation, not constitutional command.")
(citing Nat'1 Org. for Marriage v. McKee, 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011); Human Life of
Wash., Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 2010)).
9 Barland, 751 F.3d at 487-88.
9 See id. at 488.
96 See id.
9 See id. at 488-89.
98 See Barland, 751 F.3d at 488-90.
9 Id. at 490.
1o Id.:
Instead, as the Supreme Court has instructed in applying exacting scrutiny,
our inquiry depends on whether there is a substantial relation between
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exacting scrutiny, the government must demonstrate that there
is a substantial relation between the challenged disclosure
regulation and a sufficiently important governmental interest.101
Using this analysis, the court found that the disclosure law was
valid and constitutional.1 02
Although the Seventh Circuit's rejection of the major
purpose test in Madigan is quite clear, the court muddled its
stance with its decision two years later in Barland. In Barland,
the court invalidated a Wisconsin statute because it failed to
pass the major purpose test.103 The court revisited its holding in
Madigan, and held that, even though Madigan held the major
purpose test to be statutory interpretation, "[i]t continues in
force and effect as an important check against regulatory
overreach and becomes more significant as the scope and
burdens of the regulatory system increase."1 04 Furthermore, the
court distinguished the statute at issue in Madigan from the one
before the court, noting that the Wisconsin statute imposed full-
fledged political committee requirements upon any organization
based on a low expenditure threshold of only $300.105 The court
reasoned that these heavy requirements, coupled with the
breadth of the law, made the statute much more like the Federal
Election Campaign Act in Buckley than the Illinois statute in
Madigan.106 Somewhat oddly, the court incorporated the major
purpose test into its exacting scrutiny analysis and found that
the statute did not pass exacting scrutiny because it applied to
non-major purpose groups.1 07 Thus, the court functionally
reinstated the major purpose test as a limit when disclosure
regulations are burdensome enough.
Illinois's interest in informing its electorate about who is speaking before an
election and Article 9's regulation of campaign-related spending by groups
whose major purpose is not electoral politics.
101 Id. at 477.
102 Barland, 751 F.3d at 491 ("We conclude that Article 9's regulation as political
committees of groups that lack the major purpose of influencing elections does not
condemn the disclosure law as unconstitutionally overbroad.").
103 Id. at 842.
104 Id. at 839.
10 Id. at 839-40.
106 See Barland, 751 F.3d at 839 ("In contrast, Wisconsin law suffers from the same
kind of overbreadth as the federal statute at the time of Buckley, so the major-purpose
limitation has the same significance here as it did there.").
107 See id. at 841.
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D. Understanding the Competing Stances
The circuit split over the role of the major purpose test is
the result of a few critical differences in interpretation. The
courts that hold the major purpose test to be a test for
constitutionality interpret Buckley's language broadly to create
a constitutional limit, applicable to more than just the Federal
Election Campaign Act.108 These courts see MCFL's use of the
test as an affirmation of it as a constitutional standard. 109 They
read McConnell very narrowly as striking down only the express
advocacy/issue advocacy distinction from Buckley as statutory
interpretation, leaving other constructions untouched.1 10 They
also view McConnell's brief mention of the test in a footnote as
further affirmation of the test."'
The courts that reject the major purpose test as a
constitutional requirement interpret Supreme Court
jurisprudence in a much different way. This begins with
Buckley, which the circuit courts interpret as primarily
interpretation of the Federal Election Campaign Act. 112 As a
result, courts rejecting the test interpret it to be nothing more
than a construction of the Federal Election Campaign Act and
not a broader constitutional limit. These courts take MCFL to be
of little importance, as it mentions the test only in relation to
the Federal Election Campaign Act.113 The next key difference is
in their interpretation of McConnell. Here, courts view the
Supreme Court's rejection of the express advocacy/issue
advocacy distinction from Buckley as confirmation that the
'0s See N.M. Youth Organized v. Herrera, 611 F.3d 669, 679 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding
that a state statute is unconstitutional for not incorporating the major purpose test);
N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 288 (4th Cir. 2008) ("Thus, we are
convinced that the Court in Buckley did indeed mean exactly what it said when it held
that an entity must have 'the major purpose' of supporting or opposing a candidate to be
designated a political committee."); Colorado Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498
F.3d 1137, 1153-54 (10th Cir. 2007) (rejecting the argument that the major purpose test
is not constitutionally compelled).
os0 See, e.g., Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 692 F.3d 864,
872 (8th Cir. 2012); Leake, 525 F.3d at 288.
110 See Coffman, 498 F.3d at 1153-54.
1n See Leake, 525 F.3d at 288.
112 See Vt. Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Sorrell, 758 F.3d 118, 136 (2d Cir. 2014); Ctr.
for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 487 (7th Cir. 2012); NOM1, 649 F.3d
34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011).
113 See, e.g., Madigan, 697 F.3d at 488 ("[MCFL] shows that there is nothing
constitutionally magical about being labeled as a political committee; what matters are
the burdens that attend the classification.").
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major purpose test is only statutory interpretation because both
were narrowing constructions. 11 4
To simplify everything greatly, the circuit split is a result of
the courts taking different interpretative approaches to
Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits read Buckley broadly, and thereby hold that the major
purpose test is a constitutional requirement and not just an
interpretation of the Federal Election Campaign Act. These
same courts also interpret McConnell narrowly, so that it only
invalidates Buckley's express advocacy/issue advocacy
distinction and not any of its other constructions. The Ninth
Circuit also reads Buckley broadly to create a constitutional
requirement, but also interprets it differently, resulting in its
use of "a" major purpose test. Conversely, the First, Second,
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits read Buckley narrowly as an
instance of statutory interpretation and McConnell broadly as
affirmation of that.
III. THE SOLUTION: REJECT THE MAJOR PURPOSE TEST
Establishing appropriate limits to disclosure laws is
important because, although these laws increase the
transparency of the political process,115 they can also violate
individuals' privacy and chill protected political speech if they
are too burdensome. 116 Furthermore, disclosure requirements
are one of the only remaining options for states to regulate
campaign finance.'17 This makes finding the right balance
between compelling disclosure and protecting individual rights
paramount. The major purpose test certainly attempts to draw a
bright line in an effort to strike the balance. 118 Therefore,
"' See, e.g., Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 136; Madigan, 697 F.3d at 487; NOMI, 649 F.3d at
59.
n1 See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 371 (2010) ("The
First Amendment protects political speech; and disclosure permits citizens and
shareholders to react to the speech of corporate entities in a proper way. This
transparency enables the electorate to make informed decisions and give proper weight
to different speakers and messages."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976).
n1 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68 (recognizing that disclosure requirements could chill
speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment).
117 See McCutcheon v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1462 (2014) (striking
down the federal aggregate contribution limit); Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 312 (finding
federal limits on corporate independent expenditures to be unconstitutional).
"s Whether the major purpose test actually draws a bright-line is arguable. The
Federal Election Commission currently applies a fact-intensive test on a case-by-case
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whether it applies has a major impact, especially because many
of the laws upheld by the courts not using the major purpose
test would be struck down if the test were applied. 119
Ultimately, the circuit split is best resolved by rejecting the
major purpose test as a constitutional limit on disclosure laws.
Two different types of arguments explain why. First, there is no
legal basis to use the major purpose test because it is neither a
constitutional limit, nor a test applicable to laws imposing only
disclosure requirements. Second, there is no policy reason to use
the major purpose test, as it makes disclosure laws less effective,
yields perverse results, and fails to serve its original aim of
protecting individual privacy. Taking all of this into
consideration, exacting scrutiny should be used instead to
determine what groups may be regulated because it properly
shifts the focus onto whether the benefits of disclosure outweigh
the burdens.
A. The Major Purpose Test Does Not Apply to State Disclosure
Laws
1. The major purpose test is statutory interpretation.
From the legal perspective, the question of whether the
major purpose test applies to state laws as a constitutional
requirement hinges upon Buckley and McConnell. Based on
these cases there are two primary reasons to disregard the test.
First, the test was created in Buckley as statutory interpretation
of the Federal Election Campaign Act. Second, even if the test is
more than statutory interpretation, it does not apply to laws
that impose only disclosure requirements because the statute in
Buckley imposed not only disclosure requirements, but hard
caps on individual contribution limits and source restrictions.
The Supreme Court used the major purpose language in
Buckley when interpreting the Federal Election Campaign Act
to avoid constitutional concerns, a point on which the circuit
basis. See Real Truth About Abortion, Inc. v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 681 F.3d 544, 556
(4th Cir. 2012).
us See, e.g., Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 123 (upholding a definition of political committee
based upon contributionlexpenditure amounts and not the purpose of an organization);
Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 812 (7th Cir. 2014) (upholding a
Wisconsin statute that triggered disclosure requirements based upon a group's
expenditures/contributions); NOM I, 649 F.3d at 58 (upholding a Maine statute that
based political committee status upon contribution/expenditure amounts).
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courts are in agreement. 120 The Buckley Court did not mention
the major purpose requirement as applying to anything besides
its interpretation of the Federal Election Campaign Act. In
addition, the Court has never applied the test to state laws.
Thus, there is no reason to think that the test is anything more
than statutory interpretation.
However, even if Buckley's major purpose language is
interpreted to be a constitutional limit, McConnell nullifies it.
The Court in McConnell addressed Buckley as a case of statutory
interpretation and ultimately held that Buckley's express
advocacy limitation was, as a result, not a constitutional limit. 1 2 1
In this discussion, McConnell does not mention the major
purpose test explicitly, but it does mention the other narrowing
constructions created in Buckley. 122 A strict reading of
McConnell does not invalidate or change the major purpose test
because the Court never makes such statements. The Court's
holding does, however, strongly suggest that the statutory
definitions created in Buckley do not have broader
application elsewhere. 123
Reading the Supreme Court's holdings consistently confirms
that the major purpose test is statutory interpretation. The
explicit language of Buckley does not create a major purpose
requirement for all disclosure laws. At the same time, the
explicit language of McConnell does not invalidate the major
120 See, e.g., Sorrell, 758 F.3d at 136 ("When the Buckley Court construed the
relevant federal statute to reach only groups having 'the major purpose' of electing a
candidate, it was drawing a statutory line. It was not holding that the Constitution
forbade any regulations from going further.") (citing McConnell v. Fed. Elections
Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 191-93 (2003)); N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 274, 327
(4th Cir. 2008) (noting that the major purpose test was a narrowing construction of the
Federal Election Campaign Act).
121 See McConnell v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 191-92 (2003).
122 See id. (mentioning the definitions created in Buckley for "expenditure," "relative
to," "for the purpose of ... influencing," and the "magic words" of express advocacy)
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 40-46 (1976)).
123 See id. at 103 ("Buckley and MCFL were specific to the statutory language before
the Court and in no way drew a constitutional boundary that forever fixed the
permissible scope of provisions regulating campaign-related speech."). See also Richard
Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending, 27 L.J. & POL.
683, 693-94 (2012) (arguing that whether the major purpose test was a constitutional
limit was ambiguous even after Buckley, and McConnell provides evidence that it indeed
may not be); Miriam Galston, Symposium, The Law of Politics: The Role of Law in
Advancing Democracy: Emerging Constitutional Paradigms and Justifications for
Campaign Finance Regulation: The Case of 527 Groups, 95 GEO. L.J. 1181, 1221-25
(2007) (noting that McConnell requires reexamination of the major purpose test, as it
could allow for broader regulation of groups than previously thought).
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purpose test. On the other hand, a broad reading of Buckley
establishes the test as a constitutional requirement, and a broad
reading of McConnell invalidates it. The circuit split arose
because courts that endorse the test as a constitutional
requirement read Buckley broadly, which makes the test a
constitutional requirement, but McConnell narrowly so it does
not invalidate the test as statutory construction. A consistent
reading of both cases, either narrowly or broadly, demonstrates
that the test is not, in fact, constitutionally required.
2. The major purpose test does not apply to disclosure
laws.
Even if the test is a constitutional limit, the major purpose
test does not apply to state laws that impose only disclosure
requirements. When the test was created in Buckley, the Court
was restricting the application of not only disclosure laws but
also the imposition of spending limits and source restrictions. 12 4
This is supported by Justice O'Connor's concurrence in MCFL,
as she found that Buckley was concerned not only about the
imposition of disclosure requirements but about regulatory
burdens overall. 125 In this light, Buckley demonstrates that the
Court's real concern is not about disclosure in particular, but
regulatory burdens generally.1 26 Thus, the major purpose test
does not apply to laws imposing only disclosure requirements
unless there are additional speech restrictions.1 2 7 This is
consistent with the Court's recent holding in Citizens United,
124 See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1)-(2) (imposing hard contribution limits on political
committees); id. § 441b(a) (prohibiting political committees from receiving contributions
from banks or corporations) (held unconstitutional by Citizens United v. Fed. Elections
Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). See also Tara Malloy, A New Transparency: How to
Ensure Disclosure from "Mixed-Purpose" Groups After Citizens United, 46 U.S.F. L. REV.
425, 435 (2012) (describing the restrictions imposed on political committees).
12 MCFL, 479 U.S. 238, 265-66 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In my view, the
significant burden on MCFL in this case comes not from the disclosure requirements
that it must satisfy, but from the additional organizational restraints imposed upon it by
the Act.").
126 Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV.
413, 431-32 (2012).
127 Kristy Eagan, Note, Dark Money Rises: Federal and State Attempts to Rein in
Undisclosed Campaign-Related Spending, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 801, 860-61 (2012) ("In
Buckley, the Supreme Court read the major purpose test into a provision that acted not
only as a regulation, but also as a ban on speech by restricting the amounts and sources
of contributions to PACs. The current PAC requirements serve only to regulate speech,
thus eliminating the need for the major purpose test.").
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which stresses the importance of minimizing regulatory burdens
to protect political speech, 128 and the Court's general disposition
towards favoring disclosure laws over other forms of campaign
finance restrictions. 12 9 Therefore, even if the major purpose test
is read to be a constitutional limit, it should not be applied to
laws that impose only disclosure obligations-some greater
restriction on speech is needed.
B. The Major Purpose Test Harms Disclosure Interests and
Does Not Protect Rights
In addition to being inapplicable to state laws under
Supreme Court jurisprudence, the major purpose test should
also be rejected because it is simply bad policy. The test
decreases the effectiveness of disclosure laws, creates perverse
results where large donors can avoid regulation but small
donors cannot, and fails to protect individual privacy rights.
1. The major purpose test makes disclosure laws less
effective.
Limiting disclosure laws to apply only to organizations
whose major purpose is electoral advocacy makes such laws
much less effective for a variety of reasons. First, most
organizations simply do not have a single major purpose. 30 The
major purpose test effectively means that disclosure laws can
only apply to PACs and other groups expressly formed to
influence elections. Under the test, it is thus unconstitutional to
require disclosure from most individuals and organizations,
regardless of how great their impact may be. This curtails the
effectiveness of disclosure laws, as limiting the scope of their
applicability reduces the amount of information available to
voters. Second, it makes no sense to consider only the operative
goal of an organization when determining if it should be forced
to disclose or not. As addressed in the next section, this only
encourages groups to tailor their purpose to avoid regulation.
128 See Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 336-41 (2010).
129 McMahon, supra note 13, at 772-74 (arguing that the Supreme Court's holdings
in McConnell, MCFL, and Citizens United demonstrate that the Court heavily favors
disclosure regulation over other forms of campaign finance regulation).
130 See N.C. Right to Life, Inc. v. Leake, 525 F.3d 288, 331-32 (4th Cir. 2008)
(Michael, J., dissenting).
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For this same reason-that the major purpose test looks
only at operative goal and not any tangible concern-the major
purpose test also fails to prevent corruption, one of the original
compelling government interests for disclosure laws identified
in Buckley. 131
2. The major purpose test creates perverse results.
The major purpose test allows groups engaged in similar
election-related activity to be regulated in very different ways
based solely upon their other activity, which does not help
ensure the efficacy of disclosure laws. 132 As both the First and
Seventh Circuit addressed, and as legal scholars have noted,
this creates "perverse results."1 33 By allowing only those groups
with "the" major purpose of political advocacy to be regulated, it
encourages groups to diversify their activities to avoid
regulation. 134 For example, imagine an organization advocates
for or against candidates that support its stance. If the group
wants to avoid disclosure regulations, under the major purpose
test all it would need to do is devote a majority of its resources to
other forms of advocacy, perhaps through educational
programming or legislative lobbying.
This becomes harmful as large groups with more money and
influence-groups that disclosure laws should be most concerned
with-have greater resources to diversify enough to avoid
disclosure. Small groups with much smaller coffers, and as a
result much less influence, are unable to diversify and are thus
subject to the disclosure requirements. At the same time, these
smaller groups are more sensitive to the regulatory burden
because they have fewer resources, and are therefore more likely
to be silenced. In this regard, the major purpose test is "divorced
131 See Benjamin S. Feuer, Comment, Between Political Speech and Cold, Hard,
Cash: Evaluating the FEC's New Regulations for 527 Groups, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 925,
951-52 (2006) ("The 'major purpose' test shifts focus away from the corruption rationale
in its regulation of any group promoting, supporting, attacking, or opposing a federal
candidate, and threatens to overinclusively regulate many groups that pose no
corruptive or potentially corruptive threat.").
132 Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 19, at 517-18.
133 See Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 488-89 (7th Cir.
2012); NOM 1, 649 F.3d 34, 59 (1st Cir. 2011); Briffault, supra note 125, at 693-94;
Torres-Spelliscy, supra note 19, at 281 n. 161.
'- See Madigan, 697 F.3d at 488-89; NOMI, 649 F.3d at 59.
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from reality." 135 It enables groups to avoid regulation solely
based upon how they operate, thereby allowing groups that
clearly intend to influence elections to avoid regulation. 136
Although this may seem to be a cumbersome way to avoid
disclosure, statistics suggest that groups seeking to influence
elections adapt their behavior specifically to do just that. 137 For
disclosure laws to be truly effective, it is necessary to regulate
these groups that would likely be shielded from regulation by
the major purpose test.138
3. The Major Purpose Test Fails to Protect Privacy.
The major purpose test also fails to protect the individual
privacy interests it was originally created to protect. In Buckley,
the Court was worried that imposing forced disclosure
requirements on organizations would violate privacy rights of
association and belief protected by the First Amendment.1 39
Indeed, forced disclosure can greatly infringe upon individual
privacy and lead to direct and specific negative consequences
like harassment and social ostracism.1 40 Though there is a lack
of real data showing the extent to which retaliation or threats of
retaliation created by forced disclosure are real, anecdotal
evidence exists.141 Further, the ease with which information
spreads via the internet makes it easier for this to happen. 142
Moreover, merely a perceived risk of retaliation can prevent
135 Ball, supra note 13, at 723.
1a6 Potter & Morgan, supra note 6, at 471-72.
137 See Alex Engler, Dark Money Organizations Change Strategies to Keep Donors
Secret, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (Sept. 25, 2012), available at http://sunlight
foundation.com/blog/2012/09/25/dark-money-organizations-change-strategies-to-keep-do
nors-secret/, archived at http://perma.cc/5KF7-YNQ2 (finding that PACs have adapted to
recent court rulings and regulatory changes by manipulating their expenditures to avoid
disclosure requirements); Robert Maguire, What Citizens United (et al) Wrought: The
Shadow Money Explosion, OPENSECRETS.ORG (Sept. 18, 2012), available at
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2012/09/what-citizens-united-et-al-wrought/, arhived at
http//perma.cd5U5X-XBUM (demonstrating that organizations' election spending changed
after the Supreme Court's rulings in Wisconsin Right to Life and Citizens United to avoid
disclosure regulation).
13s See Johnstone, supra note 127, at 432.
139 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976).
140 William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre's Checkbook: Privacy Costs of Political
Contribution Disclosure, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1, 16-17 (2003).
141 Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Symposium, Disclosures About Disclosure, 44 IND. L. REV.
255, 271-77 (2010).
142 Id. at 276-77.
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people from speaking, even if the threat is not real. 143 Studies
show that a low disclosure threshold of $100 or less can keep
people from contributing. 1 4 4 Low disclosure thresholds are also
likely to obscure useful data by producing too much low-value
information, while simultaneously jeopardizing vulnerable
individuals who are most likely to be subject to threats or
harassment.145 Minor individual donors are especially
vulnerable to harassment and retaliation from
forced disclosure. 146
The major purpose test theoretically could help protect the
privacy interests of donors by allowing groups with only a minor
interest in election advocacy to avoid regulation, but, the way
the test is structured, it fails to fully protect this interest.
Generally, those who donate the smallest amounts are the most
vulnerable; however, the major purpose test does not
differentiate between groups based on the amount of their
donation. As previously discussed, the test focuses only on
operational goals. Small groups that donate little are just as
likely to be subject to forced disclosure as large groups that
donate millions. In fact, large groups are even less likely to be
forced to disclose because they can diversify to avoid regulation.
Thus, the major purpose test does not adequately protect the
privacy interests of small groups or organizations and fails to
serve its original purpose.
C. Exacting Scrutiny Best Serves All Interests
Because of the major purpose test's flaws, exacting scrutiny
should be used instead.147 The Court in Buckley itself
acknowledged that exacting scrutiny was the appropriate
analysis to determine if disclosure laws generally were
143 Id. at 277-80.
144 See Raymond J. La Raja, Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative
Effect of Transparency on Making Small Campaign Contributions, 36 POL. BEHAV. 753,
768-69 (2013).
14 Michael D. Gilbert, Campaign Finance Disclosure and the Information Tradeoff,
98 IOWA L. REV. 1847, 1871-73 (2013).
146 See Jacob Gardener, Sunlight Without Sunburns: Balancing Public Access and
Privacy in Ballot Measure Disclosure Laws, 18 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 262, 275-77
(2012).
147 See, e.g., Ctr. for Individual Freedom v. Madigan, 697 F.3d 464, 490 (7th Cir.
2012); NOMI, 649 F.3d 34, 56 (1st Cir. 2011).
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unconstitutional. 14 8 Under this analysis, the government must
show a substantial relation between disclosure requirements
and a sufficiently important governmental interest. 149 As the
Buckley Court explained, the three broad government interests
served by disclosure laws in the electoral context are informing
the public, preventing corruption and the appearance of
corruption, and helping prevent other violations of election
laws.150 These interests must be weighed against the burdens of
disclosure: identification and organization.15 1 The Court's more
recent holding in Citizens United supports this, as the Court
focused its analysis on weighing the benefits of campaign
finance regulation with its burdens. 152 Using exacting scrutiny
in place of the major purpose test thereby properly shifts the
locus of courts' analysis from what the operational purpose of
regulated groups are, to whether the government's disclosure
interests outweigh the burdens on those groups'
constitutional rights.
As previously discussed, the major purpose test's focus on
operational goals is divorced from any real constitutional
concern or disclosure interests. By removing such a focus and
replacing it with exacting scrutiny, courts are better able to
focus their analysis on the issues that actually matter: whether
the interests of disclosure outweigh the burdens imposed. Use of
exacting scrutiny would have resulted in much of the same
analysis and reasoning that the courts adhering to the major
purpose test have already used. The difference is that, instead of
having to strike down the laws for not following the major
purpose test, they could strike them down for simply being
too burdensome.
For example, in Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc.
v. Swanson,153 it is clear that the court's problem with the
disclosure law at issue is that the organizational requirements it
imposes are simply too onerous on small groups to justify its
14 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976).
149 Citizens United v. Fed. Elections Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 366 (2010).
150 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68.
151 See Johnstone, supra note 127, at 426-33.
152 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. 310 at 339-40 (explaining how the variety of filing,
recording, and organizational requirements were so burdensome as to equate to an
outright ban on speech in violation of the First Amendment).
153 692 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2012).
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benefits. 154 The court, however, is unable to strike down the law
for this reason due to its adherence to the major purpose test.
Instead, the court is forced to go through the major purpose test
framework and through that lens find that the law is
unconstitutional because such onerous burdens can only be
imposed on major purpose groups. It is more straightforward for
the court to simply strike down the law because it is too
burdensome to survive exacting scrutiny instead of having to
veil such concerns behind the cloak of the major purpose test.
This would allow courts to focus on the crux of the issue: do the
benefits of disclosure outweigh its costs? It does not matter
whether a group's major purpose is electoral advocacy; what
matters is whether the government has a compelling reason to
force disclosure. Legislatures could then stop worrying about
crafting disclosure regimes that satisfy the major purpose test-
and as a result are less effective-and instead focus on making
sure that they only impose burdens that are commensurate with
the benefits of disclosure.
The major purpose test's weaknesses are also present in the
other alternatives that have been used, including both the Ninth
Circuit's "a" major purpose test and the Seventh Circuit's use of
the major purpose test in its exacting scrutiny analysis. Much
like the standard test, the Ninth Circuit's "a" major purpose test
is not designed to weigh the benefits and harms of disclosure
regulation, but instead focuses on organizations' operational
goals. This means that under "a" major purpose test, groups are
still able to avoid regulation by manipulating their books and
stated purposes. Even though it is not as easy for groups to do
this, it is certainly still possible. Furthermore, the use of "a"
major purpose test again shifts the focus away from whether the
benefits of disclosure justify the burdens imposed onto the
irrelevant goals of regulated groups; the primary weakness of
the major purpose test.
The same critique applies to the Seventh Circuit's use of the
test in Barland. When the court decided to bring the major
purpose back as "an important check" on disclosure laws, the
court only did so because it was concerned with the burden
154 Id. at 873-74 (giving an example of two farmers who may want to engage in
political activity but will not do so because of the organizational burdens imposed by
Minnesota's disclosure laws).
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imposed by the disclosure laws. 155 However, bringing the major
purpose test back obfuscates this. It makes it seem like an
organization's operational goal plays some role when it really
does not. If the court thinks that the organizational burdens
simply outweigh the benefits of disclosure, the court need not
resurrect the major purpose test to rectify the problem. Exacting
scrutiny allows for the same analysis and result, without
muddying the water of why the disclosure law
is unconstitutional.
Ultimately, exacting scrutiny is the best analysis to use
when examining the constitutionality of disclosure laws because
it focuses on what's actually important-whether the
government's interest is compelling enough to justify the
burdens imposed. If disclosure requirements impose a heavy
enough administrative burden on groups, the courts may find
such requirements to be unconstitutional like the Supreme
Court did in Citizens United.156 In addition, courts may grant as-
applied exceptions for groups that spend only small amounts of
money,157 as the Supreme Court originally suggested they do
in Buckley.158
CONCLUSION
In the modern era of election law, there are two threats that
disclosure regulations pose. First, disclosure regulations can
chill protected political speech by imposing onerous and
burdensome reporting requirements. Second, they can violate
individual privacy. The major purpose test was created in
Buckley to address these very real concerns, but the test itself
fails to adequately protect either interest. Instead, it creates an
easy loophole through which sophisticated groups can navigate,
while smaller, more vulnerable groups are ensnared. The
15s Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 839-40 (7th Cir. 2014)
(describing how the major purpose test should apply because the state law, like the
Federal Election Campaign Act in Buckley, imposed heavy organizational burdens on
small groups).
156 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366-67; Richard Briffault, Symposium,
Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 643, 663-70 (2011).
157 See, e.g., Sampson v. Buescher, 625 F.3d 1247, 1259-61 (10th Cir. 2010); Canyon
Ferry Rd. Baptist Church of E. Helena, Inc. v. Unsworth, 556 F.3d 1021, 1033-34 (9th
Cir. 2009).
15 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74.
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solution is to reject the major purpose test as a constitutional
limit. Buckley created the major purpose test only as a way to
narrowly construe the Federal Election Campaign Act;
McConnell's general interpretation of Buckley's narrowing
constructions as statutory interpretation confirms this.
Interpreting the major purpose test as a constitutional limit
requires a broader reading of Buckley than is supported by the
text itself, confirmed by the fact that most subsequent holdings
by the Court have served to limit Buckley's holdings rather than
expand them. In its place, exacting scrutiny should be applied.
Exacting scrutiny allows courts to properly weigh all parties'
interests in disclosure regulations by shifting the focus onto
whether their benefits outweigh their burdens. This grants
legislatures the ability to craft disclosure laws that effectively
capture information while also respecting individual rights.
